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1.0 Introduction 
In 2001 Ministers of Agriculture in Canada undertook a review of safety net programs. The 
review focused on two general questions about safety net programs.   
•  How well do existing
1 programs work together? 
•  How well do they work as stabilization tools?  
The review resulted in four general criticisms of existing programs.  They are: 
•  There is a linkage problem between CFIP and current NISA: CFIP can be accessed without 
drawing down NISA balances, because the “triggers” are not linked, there can be “double 
coverage of losses under the two programs. 
•  There is a consistency problem between CFIP and Crop Insurance.  They both deal with 
disasters, but one has a premium while the other does not.  Timing of payments may also 
cause pressure for ad hoc programs. 
•  There is a coverage gap because negative margin coverage only exists in crop insurance and 
only for a number of commodities. 
•  Crop insurance is criticized for having high premiums and low coverage in some areas. 
At the same time, working groups composed of federal government, provincial governments and 
producer representatives began the process of reviewing the current business risk programs and 
considering alternatives. As a result of these and other activities a new business risk management 
program has been proposed.  It will be described in section 2.0.   
1.1  Industry Concerns With Proposed Program 
To date, the proposed program has not met with acceptance from some members of the 
agricultural industry.  The Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) expresses a number of 
reservations or concerns. CFA’s concerns include: 
•  The proposed program does not address chronic low prices, especially in a situation created 
by foreign subsidies – the “trade injury” argument. 
•  The proposed program may be too rigid to respond to specific regional conditions. 
•  The proposed program will be less affordable because it requires farmers to deposit their 
contribution to it.  This may affect cash flow. Producers may not find the proposed program 
                                                 
1 Existing programs include crop insurance, NISA (Net Income Stabilization Accounts), and CFIP (Canadian Farm 
Income Program), as well as companion programs available in some provinces. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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acceptable because it is perceived that it provides no more stability and farmers’ share of the 
risk will increase. The proposed program raises several questions about trade policy that 
likely can’t be fully answered until either the next round of the WTO is settled, or until there 
is a test of the program in a NAFTA or WTO dispute. The fear is that the new program, 
because of the changes, may invite a dispute.  They see no reason to risk it if the proposed 
program is not materially better than the current program. 
•  There is substantial concern with discussion about the “investment” trigger.  This refers to 
the intent by some in government to use the program to encourage investment in 
infrastructure – e.g. investment in equipment that will enhance farm environmental practices.  
Fundamentally, the fear is that governments will impose regulations on farmers that will 
increase their costs and then expect them to pay for those costs out of stabilization funds.  
Farmers believe these costs should be kept separate, and that farmers should be compensated 
directly if governments increase their costs. 
•  The proposed program substantially changes the nature of the “entitlement”.  With the 
current NISA program, governments contribute to the program when farmers do, and farmers 
can manage their stabilization dollars in a way that best suits their particular operations.  
With the new program, government only contributes when there is a need as defined by the 
program’s triggering mechanism.  This removes control from farmers and raises the question 
about what happens if the program is not triggered.  In other words, if the commitment is 
$1.1 billion per year, but the program does not trigger $1.1 billion, is the remainder lost to or 
invested in agriculture?   
•  There are questions about how supply managed commodities will be handled in the program.  
In essence, the concern is how to ensure that a farmer with supply managed products is 
“covered” under the program for any non-supply managed products, without jeopardizing the 
intention of providing no government support for supply management. 
These concerns have led to an impasse between government and farm organizations regarding 
the proposed programs.  Because of the issues and the lack of clarity on them, the three senior 
authors of this report were engaged as third parties to assess the programs and the supporting 
research on the programs to examine the relative merits of the proposed new program and the 
proposed industry program compared to the current programs.  The specific terms of reference 
for this report and its objectives are as follows.   
1.2  Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this assessment as outlined in the terms of reference is: 
“To obtain an assessment by an independent third party of the expected performance of the 
proposed new business risk management program’s proposed New NISA and production 
insurance  relative to the current set of risk management programming, including NISA, CFIP, 
crop insurance and companion programs.”  
Within this context, the specific mandate and scope is to assess “the extent to which the current An Assessment of the Proposed  
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and proposed programs meet the objectives set out by Agriculture Ministers for business risk 
management programming, as follows: 
•  to ensure programs are responsive to demand and that government dollars are directed to 
areas of need with respect to income stabilization, disaster mitigation, insurance coverage 
and investment; 
•  to provide equal treatment for farmers across Canada facing similar risk situations; 
•  to minimize the distortion of farmers’ production and marketing decisions; 
•  to focus on management of risks related to the stability of the entire farm and to avoid 
duplication of payments; 
•  to be relatively simple and easy to understand; and 
•  to facilitate long term planning by farmers.” 
As per our terms of reference, we did not commission additional research. Our analysis consisted 
of conceptual assessment of the alternative program designs and assessment of the research 
conducted by Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (AAFC) in developing the proposed program.  
The framework for our analysis, a description of the information received from AAFC, and a 
description of the research process undertaken by our research team is contained in section 3.0.  .  
In section 2.0 that follows we provide a description of the proposed New NISA program and the 
industry proposal.  Section 4.0 contains the analysis and section 5.0 contains the conclusions. 
 An Assessment of the Proposed  
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2.0  Describing the “Business Risk Management” and Industry Proposals 
This section describes the new risk management programs (Crop Insurance and “New” NISA) 
and compares these with current programs (Crop Insurance, current NISA, CFIP and companion 
programs).  It also describes the Industry Proposal as presented to us by the Canadian Federation 
of Agriculture. 
2.1  Proposed New Risk Management Programs 
The proposed new risk management programs draw on their predecessors in a number of design 
aspects.  The sections that follow highlight the commonalities and differences between them. 
2.1.1  Commonalities Between the Current and Proposed Programs 
Both the current and proposed risk management programs include Crop Insurance as a primary 
vehicle for production insurance.  Currently crop insurance provides coverage only in parts of 
the crop and horticulture industries.  The proposed risk management programs envisage a 
broadening of crop insurance to a more general production insurance vehicle that would provide 
production risk protection for a wide range of crops and horticulture products as well as for the 
livestock industry.  The options for offering this expanded form of crop insurance are currently 
being examined by the Crop Insurance Working Committee.  The Crop Insurance program will 
remain unchanged for the current year.  Accordingly, for the purposes of this analysis the Crop 
Insurance program as it currently is designed remains common between current and proposed 
programs. 
2.1.2  Differences Between the Current and Proposed Programs 
The most significant differences between the current and the proposed programs are: 
•  What is now NISA and CFIP will be combined into a single integrated program. 
•  Both the amount of income eligible for support under the new program and the actual 
distribution of program benefits are based on a “production” margin instead of eligible net 
sales and a “gross” margin.  
•  In the current NISA, the maximum contribution is generally 3% of eligible net sales to a cap 
of $250,000, with the producer contribution matched by a government contribution. 
Payments are triggered when gross margin falls below a five-year historic average.  Gross 
margin is calculated by deducting eligible expenses (calculated on a cash basis) from eligible 
revenue.  Payments are deducted first from the government fund (fund 2), and then from the 
producer fund (fund 1).  Funding for safety net payments is limited to producer and 
government balances. An Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
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•  In the current CFIP, eligibility is based on a three-year average or an Olympic 
2five year 
average of gross margin, and payments are triggered when the current year falls below 70% 
of the gross margin (and covers 100% of the loss below 70% of gross margin adjusted for 
market revenue and NISA benefits).  In CFIP, gross margin is calculated as in NISA, except 
that there is also a modified accrual adjustment for receivables, payables and changes in 
inventory for the claim year. 
•  In the proposed program, farm revenues are treated the same as in the current programs, but 
there is only one cost calculation. The “production” margin is gross margin but with fewer 
eligible expenses deducted.  Like CFIP, an accrual adjustment is made.  This means, 
therefore, that the Production Margin is much higher under the proposed program than was 
the case under the current programs – i.e. gross margin may have been $50,000, while under 
the proposed program, it may be $90,000 for the same period because fewer expenses are 
deducted.   
•  Under the proposed program, the coverage eligibility level for a farm is based on the 
Olympic five-year average.   
•  Program eligibility caps are much different under the proposed program.  Contributions 
under NISA were limited at 3% of $250,000 of eligible net sales (eligible sales less purchases 
of eligible commodities) per year per individual calculated on a cash basis and CFIP limits 
program benefits to from $145,000 to $175,000 calculated on a modified accrual basis.  With 
the proposed program, caps will be set at $975,000 of Production Margin.  An exact 
comparison is not easy to make because of the differences in the way the caps are expressed.  
But if production margin is 50% of sales, then the cap is approximately equivalent to $1.95 
million of sales.  If it is 70%, then the cap is approximately equivalent to $1.625 million of 
sales. Obviously, the sales cap is dependent on what is included as an eligible expense – the 
fewer the expenses, the higher the cap. Another aspect of cap for the proposed program is 
that the total government payment cannot exceed 70% of a farmer’s calculated loss in 
Production Margin.  This is to help ensure that the program meets WTO requirements.  
•  Under the current NISA, government’s portion is an entitlement when the farmer opts to join 
the program – i.e. the government’s portion is an entitlement when the farmer contributes to 
the program.  The farmer then has the right to claim or not claim if income falls.  It is the 
farmer’s option.  In the proposed program, the government’s portion is only due when the 
income is taken.  Therefore, governments do not incur a liability until a payment is 
triggered, and farmers will not be able to build and hold balances as with NISA.  They 
must take the money when it is triggered.   
The corollary to this is that under the current NISA program, farmers do not have “coverage” 
for the first 30% of losses until they have built a sufficient balance in their NISA account and 
the rate of accumulation is limited to 3% of ENS.  Under the proposed new NISA a farmer 
can select a coverage level up to 100% of the reference Production Margin starting in year 
                                                 
2 An Olympic average removes the high and the low years from the average calculation. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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one.  If one assumes that Production Margin is 50% of ENS, it would take a farmer three 
claim-free years to build a NISA account to provide equivalent protection.  
•  An important aspect of the proposed program is that producers’ deposits to the stabilization 
and disaster portions are not premiums in the insurance sense.  Rather they are regarded as a 
deposit that is part of their commitment to risk management.  Producers need to calculate and 
decide what level of income coverage they want, and then are responsible initially for 
contributing a third of the total deposit. 
•  Deposit levels are required to reach 100% of the producer’s risk sharing component by year 
three.  However, in the year following a margin decline of greater than 30% of the reference 
margin, the requirement re-sets to the one-third level. 
•  Another change in program design relates to the minimum income trigger.  The current NISA 
program provides for a trigger of the account when income (specifically defined on a cash 
basis and incorporating off-farm income) falls below $30,000 for the year.  This element of 
program design is considered a “support” component rather than a “stabilization” component 
and has not been incorporated into the proposed New NISA. 
2.1.3  Determining Coverage From the Proposed Program  
The proposed program has four levels of potential benefit.  The first two are the “stabilization” 
portion of the program, the third is the disaster portion and the fourth is production insurance.  
As noted previously, Crop Insurance remains unchanged at this point. 
Under the proposed program the two stabilization and one disaster portion form “layers” within 
the proposed New NISA.  The relevant components from an eligibility perspective are 70%, 
85%, and 100% of the five year average Olympic average Production Margin.  In essence, the 
lesser the Production Margin decline, the lower the government’s
3 contribution to the coverage.  
As the Production Margin increases, the government’s contribution to coverage increases.  The 
government and producer portions are as follows: 
•  Between 85% and 100%, farmer and government both contribute 50%. 
•  Between 70% and 85%, farmer contributes 30%, government contributes 70%. 
•  70% or less of Production Margin, farmer contributes 20%, government contributes 80%. 
•  Less than 0 Production Margin, government does not contribute, except through crop 
insurance.   
To understand the program better, let us assume a farm has an Olympic average Production 
Margin (i.e. a reference margin) in year one of the program of $100,000.  The farm will have the 
                                                 
3 In all cases, the federal government will pay 60% and provincial governments will pay 40% of government costs. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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choice to contribute for 70%, 85%, or 100% coverage of the reference margin.  With this 
example: 
•  If the farmer chooses 70% coverage (i.e. $70,000) then the farmer’s deposit is $14,000 (i.e. 
20% of $70,000).   
•  If the farmer chooses 85% coverage, (i.e. $85,000) then the farmer’s deposit is $18,500 (i.e. 
$14,000 from above and 30% of the next $15,000). 
•  If the farmer chooses 100% coverage, (i.e. $100,000) then the farmer’s deposit is $26,000 
(i.e. $18,500 from above and 50% of the next $15,000). 
Whichever level of coverage the farmer chooses, the farmer’s initial obligation is to deposit one 
third (1/3) of the amount.  The other two thirds (2/3) must be deposited by the end of the third 
year.  Of course, the reference margin will change each year, so the deposit may also change.   
It is important to understand that, except for changes in the reference margin, deposits do not 
change until there is a claim: in other words, the deposit is not a premium.  If there is no claim 
for ten years, and the reference margin stays at $100,000 for the entire time, the farmer’s total 
deposit is a one-time total of $14,000 (assuming 70% coverage). 
2.1.4  Making a Claim Under the Proposed Program 
A claim can be made under the proposed program when a farm’s actual Production Margin in a 
given year falls below the reference margin.  The amount of the claim is dependent on the level 
of coverage selected by the producer.   
An important aspect of the proposed program design is that payouts will be done on a “bottom” 
up basis – i.e. payments start at the level of  loss and work up until either the producer’s deposit 
is used up or the producer’s margin is brought back up to the reference margin.  This means that 
the greatest proportion of government risk sharing is accessed first.   
Returning to the example farm above, assume in a given year, the Production Margin is 60% of 
the reference – i.e. the farm has a 40% loss, which in this example is a $40,000 loss.  How much 
will a farmer receive with 70, 85 and 100% coverage? 
•  The farmer with 70% coverage will receive $26,000 (or 65% of the total loss) in government 
payment and receive the return of the entire $14,000 of his or her own deposit.  This is 
calculated as follows: 
  For the $10,000 loss between 60% and 70%, the producer’s share is $2,000 (20%), and 
the government’s is $8,000. 
  For the $15,000 loss between 70% and 85%, the producer’s share is $4,500 (30%) and 
the government’s share is $10,500. An Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
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  At this point, the producer has received $6,500 of the original deposit, thereby leaving 
$7,500.  Therefore, government pays another $7,500 to match this part between 85% and 
100%.   
  The total government contribution from the three portions is $26,000, while the farmer’s 
share is $14,000, and all of the loss is covered. 
•  Farmers with 85% and 100% coverage would not need to use their additional deposits.  
Therefore, they could be used to secure subsequent levels of protection.  In our example, a 
farmer with 85% coverage has $4,500 left on deposit, while the farmer with 100% coverage 
has $12,000 left.  This money can then be used as part or all of the deposit for subsequent 
years’ coverage under the program. 
The foregoing description reveals another interesting aspect of the proposed program – i.e. 
because of its bottom-up nature, the proposed program can provide a substantial portion of a loss 
that exceeds one’s coverage.  In the example, the farmer is covered for 100% of the total loss 
with 70% coverage.  The importance of this depends on the magnitude of the loss.  Assume 
alternatively that this example farm loses 80% of the reference margin in a given year or 
$80,000.  Below we calculate the payout with 70, 85 and 100% coverage.   
•  If the farm has 70% coverage, then the government payment is $49,333 (or 61.6% of the 
loss) at the point when the farm’s entire $14,000 deposit has been returned. (For the first 
$50,000 in losses, government pays $40,000, the farmer’s contribution is $10,000; this leaves 
$4,000 of the farmer’s deposit which at the 7/3 ratio gets used with $9,333 in government 
payment.  So, the total coverage of the $80,000 loss is $14,000 of producer deposit and 
$49,333 of government contribution, which equals $63,333 of the total loss). 
•  If the farm has 85% coverage, then the government payment is $54,500 (68.1% of the total 
loss) when the farm’s deposit has been completely returned.  (For the first $50,000 in loss, 
the farmer pays $10,000 and the government pays $40,000.  For the next $15,000, the farmer 
pays $4,500 and the government pays $10,500.  This leaves $4,000 in unused producer 
deposit, so the farmer can claim $4,000).   
•  If the farmer has 100% coverage, then the government portion is $56,000, which occurs 
because of the cap on payments of 70% of the loss. The total government payment is $54,500 
as above, plus an additional $1,500 where the cap is reached.  So the farmer would have 
$20,000 of the deposit returned, and would have $6,000 left to contribute toward the program 
in the future. An Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
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Figure 1 presents the relative payouts and producer withdrawals under a range of scenarios from 
100% decline in Production Margin through to no decline. 
Unlike the current NISA program, deposits cannot be “deemed” to have occurred.  In order to 
receive government payments, producers must select their coverage level in the spring of the 
year and deposits are required by December 31
st of that year. 
A final note on the terminology of the program is that the term “coverage” is likely confusing to 
people, at least it has been to the authors.  First, it implies that the deposit is a premium in the 
insurance or option sense.  It is not: if one were buying insurance that gives a payment only 
when the production margin falls below 70% of the reference, then it would be paid for with a 
premium that would be determined by the risk of the event (i.e. a drop below 70%) actually 
occurring.  
Second, the term “70% coverage” implies, as above, that one only receives a benefit if the claim 
year margin falls below the “coverage” level – i.e. 70% in this case.  This is not so in the 
Figure 1 Performance of Proposed Program Assuming $100,000 Reference Production  Margin 
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proposed program.  Rather it simply is a way of calculating how much deposit a producer wants 
to make.  The producer with 70% “coverage” can claim even with a 92% or even a 99% claim 
year Production Margin.  If the reference margin is $100,000 and the claim year margin is 92% 
(i.e. an $8,000 loss), then the farmer with 70% coverage can use $4,000 of his or her deposit to 
claim a matching $4,000 from the program.  So, the term “70% coverage” simply means that the 
farmer used 70% of the reference margin to calculate the deposit.  But, in fact, the deposit covers 
all the losses down to 60% of the reference margin.   
2.1.5 Structural  Changes 
An important distinction in the proposed New NISA is the plan to alter the reference margin to 
reflect structural changes in a farming operation.  For example, if a producer was in the process 
of exiting farming over a number of years to retire and reduced the size of hisor her production 
base, a structural adjustment would be incorporated into the reference margin to ensure payments 
would trigger on the basis of current margin potential.  Similarly, a producer who was expanding 
his or her business would have his reference margin adjusted to ensure he was eligible for 
sufficient coverage to protect his expanded level of risk. 
The specifics of how these adjustments will occur have not been determined. 
2.1.6  Continuation of the Program 
A final point about the program is what occurs when moving from one year to the next.  There 
are three possible situations: 
•  Reference margin remains unchanged.  In this situation, the producer’s deposit to the 
program would not change – if I’ve elected 70% coverage and the reference margin does not 
change, then my deposit continues to cover me at the 70% level. 
•  Reference margin increases.  An increase in the reference margin means that a farmer is 
eligible for a higher level of coverage.  In our example farm, assume that in year two of the 
program, the farm had a good year and the reference margin increases to $110,000.  Now 
with 70% coverage, the farm is eligible to increase its protection to $77,000.  It would 
therefore need to add to its deposit accordingly (i.e. the total deposit would increase from 
$14,000 to $15,400). 
•  Reference margin declines.  In this case, the producer’s minimum deposit would decline 
because of a drop in the margin that resulted in a claim.  But some or all of the existing 
deposit is used up because of the claim.  In this case, the producer will be required to bring 
the deposit back to the new required level given the new reference margin.  If the margin was 
more than 30% lower than the reference margin, then the producer will be allowed to 
recharge the deposit at 1/3 of the required amount in the subsequent year and will be required 
to have the full amount on deposit by the end of the third year subsequent to the loss. 
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2.2  The Industry Proposal 
The industry proposal continues to evolve as this report is being written.  The industry proposal, 
as presented to the National Safety Nets Advisory Committee (NSNAC) on February 7
th, 2003, 
consisted of the broad concept for the program. Specific parameters were to be decided after 
considering results of initial modelling. The broad outline of the proposed structure is as follows:  
•  As with the proposed New NISA, the industry proposal would include a stabilization portion 
and a disaster portion.   
•  Payments would be triggered by a decline in the Production Margin as in the proposed New 
NISA. 
•  The stabilization component would be based on matching government and producer 
contributions to producer accounts, while the government funding for the disaster component 
would be available only upon triggering a withdrawal and taking it (“entitlement”). 
•  Farmers would have the choice to withdraw money from the stabilization component as they 
do now for the current NISA. Because the program would use a single margin for both 
stabilization and disaster, it would imply a shift to modified accrual accounting for both the 
stabilization and disaster triggers.  
•  The minimum income trigger would be retained in the industry proposal. 
A first run of the program was based on parameters suggested by NSNAC’s Technical Working 
Group. The structure of the initial model, includes the following features: 
•  The stabilization portion would have 50:50 farmer/government matching funds for the first 
15 % of income, while government would pay all of the losses below 85%.   
•  The contributions to the stabilization portion would be calculated in a similar manner as in 
the current NISA i.e. 3% of eligible net sales. However, there would be no caps on 
contributions in any one year.  
•  The disaster component would be based on 85% of the Production Margin as defined in the 
proposed New NISA.   
 An Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
     
May 2, 2003                     Page 12
3.0  Analytical Framework, Data, and Factors Affecting the Analysis 
Our task in this report is to assess the current set of programs for risk management compared to 
the proposed New NISA and the Industry Proposal. They are to be assessed relative to the 
criteria presented in Chapter 1.0, the terms of reference.  An important aspect of the terms of 
reference is that the individual components are interrelated.  For example, determining whether a 
program responds to needs in terms of its disaster, stabilization, and insurance requirements is 
not unrelated to the question of its impacts on whole farm income, or whether it provides equal 
treatment to farmers with the same risk profile in various parts of the country.  As a result of the 
interrelationship among the terms of reference, there will be some repetition in the analysis.   
In this section of the report we present the framework for analysis, the data, models and analysis 
provided by AAFC for us to analyse and a discussion of a number of factors that affected our 
ability to complete the assignment as described in the terms of reference. 
3.1  Framework for Analysis 
This section describes the theoretical framework used to compare the current and proposed 
programs to the objectives agreed to by the Ministers. 
3.1.1  Are Government dollars directed appropriate with the need?  Are the alternatives cost 
effective? 
The term “demand” in the statement of terms of reference appears to refer to “need” in other 
words, how well do the programs give assistance when there is a shortfall from one of the 
identified sources of risk?  This means analyzing the triggering mechanisms of each of the 
programs.   This is be done sequentially along the following steps: 
•  First, compare program designs.  Based on the sources of risk determine whether the designs 
of each will likely meet the needs in concept. Is one trigger more responsive to need than 
another in concept? 
•  Second, are there differences in their sensitivity in reality.That is, once the concept is 
translated to a program rule, are the conclusions about responsiveness to need the same as in 
concept?  Here, we need to examine whether the tests and simulations that have been done by 
AAFC address this question adequately. If not, what would? If so, what do they show?  
•  There appears to be little specifically on cost and efficiency in the terms of reference.  Farm 
organizations have concern about the affordability of the proposed New NISA.  It would be 
inappropriate to avoid the question of cost and cost effectiveness in this assessment.  There 
appears to be considerable information in the research that can be used to address this.  What 
can we learn from what’s been done and do we need more?  How can/should we differentiate 
between cost and cash flow?  An Assessment of the Proposed  
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3.1.2 Equal  Treatment. 
The issue is whether farmers with similar risk situations in different parts of the country will be 
treated the same. It is not about whether the risks are different in different places. Two ways to 
approach this are: 
•  Design: Is there anything inherent in the design of programs that result in inequity among 
regions or commodities? Would there be any difference in the triggers in a given program for 
different parts of the country? 
•  Simulations and tests:  Do the simulations address this question? If not, can they and what 
can we conclude?  What more is needed?   
3.1.3  Minimize Distortion in Management Decisions 
The major issue here is whether the bundles of programs mask market signals or cause farmers to 
produce certain products or make different production decisions.  Again, this  requires a three-
stage inquiry: 
•  First, is there anything in the design of the programs that mask signals or gives an incentive 
to invest in a product, or invest in a region? 
•  Second, do the actual triggers mask incentives from the market place, or provide 
inappropriate ones? 
•  Third, are there incentives for production-related moral hazards? 
3.1.4      Manage risks 
Risk management occurs if programs stabilize some measure of net income.  The question is 
what should be stabilized, how should it be measured, and how much is enough to conclude that 
a program assists in managing risks? 
•  It is not likely that agreement could be reached among economists on what is the best 
measure of income.  At least some of the work done by AAFC takes into account several 
potential measures of income.   Hence we can analyse these to see whether they are 
reasonable measures of income and, with several measures, we can obtain a notion about the 
robustness of the stabilizing effects.  By analyzing several variables and programs, we will 
have at least some comparators of performance. 
•  Fundamentally, the questions that need to be asked are which program imparts the most 
stability, and is there a difference in the cost efficiency among them? An Assessment of the Proposed  
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3.1.5 Simplicity 
The questions here are quite straight forward – are any of the sets of programs easier to 
understand and comply with than others?  Do any provide a lesser administrative burden than 
others and yet meet the overall objectives of the program? 
•  To investigate, one issue is whether there is anything different in the design of the programs 
that differentiates them in this regard. 
•  The second issue is whether application is any easier.  To address this we will review direct 
experience in applying for the current programs compared to the proposed requirements for 
the new programs as defined by AAFC program administrators. 
3.1.6  Facilitate Long Term Planning 
If a program is superior relative to this criterion, it will mean it provides a better forecast of the 
worst outcome and/or makes the worst outcome less severe.  These circumstances will make it 
easier for a manager to develop planning strategies. The questions that arise are: 
•  Are there differences in the clarity of potential outcomes? 
•  Are there differences in potential worst outcomes? 
•  Are there differences in the structures of the programs such that they provide different 
assurance of payback to lenders and, therefore, differences in the ability to finance growth 
and or ongoing efficiencies in operations? 
In appendix A of this report we have provided a table that shows the data/information source and 
activity conducted to address each objective of the proposed program. 
 
3.2  An Assessment of the Data Provided  
Three primary sources of data were provided to assist with the assessment: real farm data, model 
farm data, and NISA data. 
3.2.1  Real Farm Data 
Historic data were provided from actual farms in Ontario and Saskatchewan to illustrate the 
impact of current farm programs, the proposed program, and a program proposed by industry.  
For each farm, revenue sources, eligible revenue, expenses, accrual adjustments, and accrued 
contributions to the existing program are presented.  Ontario data consisted of five farms, three 
of which were cash crop farms (small, mid-sized, and large) and two of which were hog farms 
(small and mid sized).  The Ontario farms had information from 1995-2000.  Data from four 
Saskatchewan farms was also provided, all of which were cash crop farms.  The Saskatchewan 
farms had information from 1995-2001.   An Assessment of the Proposed  
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Based on the above historical information, real farm models simulate farm incomes under no 
safety net programs, under the current programs, and under the proposed program. 
The major strength of the real farm data is the level of detail and transparency that is presented.  
The conditions that led to farm incomes in a given year, including sales, expenses, crop 
insurance payments, and inventory changes are generally clear.  It is also clear how the 
calculation of program payments under the various safety nets is done.  Since we were provided 
with the actual models used, we were able to test the robustness of the results by varying a 
number of the parameters. 
The weaknesses of the real farm data are the following: 
•  Small sample.  A total of only nine farms in two provinces were available for the analysis.  
These farms were drawn from two farm types.  Thus, the representation is from a small and 
very narrow sample that cannot be used to make broad inferences and conclusions.   
•  Treatment of NISA Fund 1 contributions and payments.  The real farm models treat 
producers’ NISA contributions to Fund 1 as an expense.  These contributions are deposits 
that are guaranteed with interest; they are not expenses, despite the fact they represent cash 
outflows.  Similarly, NISA payments to producers drawn from Fund 1 are treated as 
revenues, when in fact (apart from the interest paid on the account) they are simply a return 
to the producer of earlier contributions.  The real farm analysis was conducted both with and 
without the producer NISA cash flows included in the measure of stabilised income.  As was 
expected, incomes were more stable when the cash flows were included, however, the 
ultimate preference for program design was not impacted by this assumption. 
•  We updated the models of the real farm data to reflect the proposed New NISA program.  
The models we were provided with modelled a previous version of the program design.  
Accordingly, we: 
  Removed the deductible provision; 
  Corrected the cost shares in each layer of the program; and 
  Replaced a five year moving average reference margin with an Olympic average 
reference Production Margin where data were available. 
•  Period reflected by the data.  Because the proposed program has a reference margin based on 
an Olympic average, five years of data are required to compute the reference Production 
Margin.  Using the real farm data, that left only one or two years in which analysis using the 
formal reference Production Margin could be used. Thus, a simple average of the available 
information was used in years where there was insufficient information to construct a proper 
Olympic average. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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3.2.2  Model Farm Data 
The model farm data was based on a representation of a typical farm commodity type.  Rather 
than represent the income and expense experience of an actual farm, the model farms generate 
data for incomes and expenses based on distributions of historical values.  Thus, given the basic 
framework of the representative farm, the values used in individual income and expense 
categories were drawn using repeated samples from a distribution (Monte Carlo approach).  
Given the individual revenue and expense values drawn from the distributions, the implications 
on farm income and stabilized net farm income were observed.   
Using this approach, many observations of potential outcomes of farm income and safety net 
support are observed.  Thus, it would appear that many more observations are possible than 
under the real farm data observed above, and that the results are most robust.  However, the 
fundamental difficulty with the model farm data is that, as part of the sampling procedure, the 
temporal link between the revenue and expense values it simulates is severed.  For example, in 
years with relatively high farm revenues, there is likely to also be relatively high expenses. In 
particular, expectations of high revenues tend to influence input costs such that expenses are 
driven higher.  The model farm simulation procedure freely mixes data across years in its 
sampling, so that sales data from high revenue years can be coupled with expense data from low 
input-cost years.  This produces results that the data suggest are possible, but ignores any 
inherent correlation between revenue and expense.  If one assumes that income and expenses are 
positively correlated then the model farm approach will overestimate the standard deviation of 
Production Margins relative to the population.  Thus, the results from the Model Farms should 
be examined in the light that the models overestimate the need for stabilization.  However, there 
is no reason to expect this to favour one program over another in the analysis.  
3.2.3 NISA  Data 
Historic data were obtained from the NISA database to provide information aggregated from 
actual farms, sorted by farm type and province.  The following characterizes the NISA data:    
•  Proposed program was modeled over the 1996 to 2000 period and compared with actual 
results under the current programs using actual data for NISA participants in each year. 
•  Margins were based on the Gross Margin definition for the current NISA and CFIP programs 
and the Production Margin definition for New NISA.  In cases, where accrual data was not 
available (because CFIP was not in existence or had not been participated in by the producer) 
accrual adjustments were simulated. This was done to ensure the programs were fully tested, 
since accrual adjustments increased the instability of margins. 
•  Contributions are adjusted in each year to reflect producer funds carried over from year to 
year and the reference margin to be covered. 
•  In each scenario, government funds are pooled with producer funds and only accessible when 
triggered and withdrawn. This means the funds only have a stabilizing affect in the year they 
are accessed. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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The advantage of the information presented from the NISA data is the volume of data and 
breadth of farm types represented.  The NISA information consists of a vast number of farms 
and spans farm types across the country.  This allows observations on program performance to 
be made with the benefit of a much larger sample size.  In addition, farms of a given type can be 
compared across provinces, and information is available on a large number of farm types. 
A weakness of the NISA data is the lack of detail provided with regard to the nature of the 
sample it is drawn from and how the various component programs were treated in the data.  For 
instance, over the time period in question (1996-2000) the parameters of companion programs 
have evolved.  As a result, the modelling on the NISA data set should be viewed as a 
comparison of the proposed programs to the current programs as they evolved over the time 
period in question rather than as they currently exist.  We understand that the exception to this is 
the CFIP program, which, while only introduced in 1999, was modelled over the full dataset. 
The ability to model the correct accrual adjustments within the NISA dataset is also limited, 
given that producers were only required to submit information on accrual adjustments when 
applying to the CFIP program. 
Secondly, only aggregate results are presented.  However, the results have been stratified so that 
one can compare the results for small versus large farms, high margin versus low margin and 
farms stabilized relatively more or less than the mean result.  For instance, while the effect of 
companion programs is blurred in the national results, an examination of the results by 
commodity, by province allows an analysis that gives full credit to the companion programs. 
The aggregate nature of the NISA data allows inferences about the broad results and impacts of 
the proposed programs.  
3.2.4  Data Value and Relationships   
While each dataset has limitations in its ability to be extrapolated to draw conclusions about the 
ability of the proposed program to stabilize farm incomes relative to existing programs, where 
there is agreement between the models on the relative merits of the programs, a fairly robust 
conclusion can be drawn, especially with respect to the grains and oilseeds, and pork sectors 
(since each are present in all three datasets).  Where the models disagree, it is more difficult to 
draw definitive conclusions as no one model is a conclusively better abstraction of reality than 
the others. 
3.3  Summary of the Process Used in This Analysis 
As implied in the foregoing discussion, and given the nature of this assessment, the procedures 
used included three major components: 
•  Listening to submissions by the parties.  The project team had two formal meetings with 
each of AAFC and CFA.  In those meetings, the parties provided their input on the issues 
identified in the terms of reference.  They also provided written submissions on their 
analysis regarding the issues in the terms.  We also attended an additional meeting of the An Assessment of the Proposed  
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safety net committee of the CFA and participated in a Safety Net Advisory Committee 
Teleconference where further input from the industry was provided.   
•  Analysis of program design.  A number of the issues in this assessment have to do with 
conceptual design of the programs.  The project team used its experience and knowledge to 
understand and anticipate the relative impacts of the alternative programs. 
•  Examination and analysis of AAFC research.  The research team had access to the results of 
the AAFC research on safety nets and for the NISA and Real Farm data access to the models 
used for analysis.   This allowed the team to test the anticipated results from the conceptual 
analysis above against the AAFC results.  
3.4  Factors Affecting the Analysis and Conclusions 
In the course of our review we have identified a number of factors that affect our ability to 
comment on the expected performance of the proposed risk programs relative to the current 
group of programs. We have documented each below with an explanation as to the impact on our 
analysis and, where possible, what we did to adjust. 
3.4.1 Crop  Insurance 
We have been advised that concurrent with the introduction of the proposed New NISA 
Program, the Crop Insurance Program will be receiving an increase in funding from current 
levels of approximately $250 million to $400 million annually.  Our understanding is that much 
of this is due to increased claims in the Prairies and Ontario over the past two years, as well as to 
slightly higher grain prices.  In addition however, it is our understanding that the overall federal 
subsidy level within the crop insurance program will move from 30% on average to 36%.  
In the longer term there has been a decision as part of the risk management program to expand 
production insurance coverage to crops for which there is currently no or limited coverage and to 
other commodities beyond crops.  The exact nature of these changes has not been determined; 
however, they will presumably include increases in the number of crops or products covered, the 
level of coverage and possibly the cost to producers of coverage.  The simulations that have been 
conducted and provided to us assume no change in crop insurance coverage.  Clearly, changes of 
this magnitude would have a significant impact on the performance of the new programs. 
Expansion of production insurance could increase the extent of negative margin coverage 
available to the industry as a whole adding increased support. 
3.4.2 Labour 
Whether labour or which components of labour (arms length and non-arms length) are included 
in the margin has not been decided.  Most recently it appears that non-arms length labour will be 
in the margin and that arms length labour costs will be deductible.  The analysis made available 
to us assumes all labour is not an eligible expense.  If this is not the case, it affects the relative 
performance of the programs in terms of timing and amount of payment triggered.  As with 
section 3.1, above, we will comment on the likely impact of the inclusion or exclusion in margin 
of labour, but cannot provide comment based on a fulsome analysis.  An Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
     
May 2, 2003                     Page 19
3.4.3  Treatment of Fund One and Two Balances  
The modeling and analysis provided to us by AAFC compares the performance of the two 
program groups based on a modeling approach that “seeds” balances into the current NISA 
program.  Accordingly this approach creates a comparison between the new programs and a 
“theoretical” set of current programs. Given that NISA balances will be returned to farmers 
regardless of the design parameters of the new program, a preferred comparison would have 
been to compare the existing program design to proposed program designs under an assumption 
of $0 starting balances.  For the real farm data we have modified the models to include an 
assumption of $0 balances.  For the models that we were not able to modify the assumption, the 
reader should understand that an assumption of a starting balance benefits the results of the 
simulations of the current programs and the industry proposal relative to the proposed New 
NISA.  However, its impact on the comparison between the current program and the industry 
proposal is not clear.  
3.4.4  Producer Deposits  
In both the communication materials and program modeling producer deposits are referred to 
and treated as costs. While there may be important administrative, political or trade reasons to 
have a formal deposit component to the program, we find that the reference to and treatment of 
these by both AAFC and CFA as “costs” to be misleading and confusing to the analysis. The 
deposit is clearly not an expense to a farmer and a return of the deposit is not income.  However, 
if one views risk as being derived from a farmer’s ability to meet other obligations after 
production expenses have been met, then the cash flows into and out of either the current or 
proposed New NISA are relevant to the discussion of the degree of risk faced by a farm.  Our 
primary concern is with labelling the flows as “costs” and “income” as we believe this serves to 
confuse people’s understanding of the deposit concept. 
3.4.5  Reference Margin Modelling 
The models were limited in their ability to simulate a true five year Olympic average (five years 
less best and worst years) for the establishment of the reference margin across the full timeframe 
for analysis.  Where the Production Margin history was too short (less than five years) to 
establish an Olympic average, a simple average of the available observations was used.  Thus, 
the full buffering effect of the Olympic average was not modelled and margin decline events in 
the first years of a simulation potentially had a different impact on the reference margin than 
those in the later years. 
3.4.6  Industry Proposal Status 
The industry proposal as provided to us and as acknowledged by CFA is not fully developed and 
is to be considered a first draft requiring further refinement. Of particular note we have as 
recently as April 23
rd received conflicting information regarding whether governments are 
expected to provide 100% coverage of losses to the 70% or the 85% level. Modelling of the 
industry proposal was undertaken. However, the cost of the program is estimated to be 
significantly higher than the cost of either the current programs or the proposed AAFC program.  
The cost is higher to the extent that it is well above the available funding envelope.  Since we are An Assessment of the Proposed  
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comparing a program that has been designed to fit within the available funds to one that is not, 
direct comparison between the programs in absolute terms is of limited value.  However, we 
have commented on the structural differences between the programs where appropriate. 
3.4.7  Documentation and Communication Materials 
Throughout our review and analysis we faced challenges with the terminology used and 
consistency of communications in the documents provided. Accordingly we draw attention to the 
potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation of program design or modelling results. In 
particular, terms such as “coverage” level, “premium” and “cost” as applied to the producer 
deposit of the proposed program convey meanings to those who know about insurance or options 
that are different than the standard definitions.  Using language that is more precise will assist in 
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4.0  Analysis of Proposed Program Compared to Current Programs 
and The Industry Proposal 
As identified above, the task of assessing alternative programs in light of the stated 
objectives involves analyzing their design and the simulated performance.  Given the 
terms of reference, this is to be accomplished by reviewing and making observations on 
existing data and research.  The purpose of this section is to provide a conceptual analysis 
of the design of the programs, and to interpret the results of data and simulations. 
Section 4.1 presents an analysis of response to needs under the proposed program. 
Section 4.2 provides an analysis of the equity of treatment of risks across farm types and 
regions.  The extent to which programs minimize the distortion in incentives between 
farm products and regions is considered in Section 4.3.  Section 4.4 considers the extent 
to which risks are stabilized on a whole-farm basis under alternative programs based on 
empirical evidence.  Section 4.5 considers the simplicity of application and claim 
procedures under alternative program conceptions.  Section 4.6 addresses the programs’ 
impacts on long-planning and 4.7 reviews the programs in terms of the needs of the 
supply managed industries.   
4.1  Need, Are Government Dollars Directed Correctly?   
The fundamental question regarding the ability of a program to respond to needs is 
whether it triggers payments when the need event happens.  More specifically, is the 
triggering mechanism for a payment sensitive to the conditions against which the 
program is designed to provide protection.  As indicated in both sections 1.0 and 3.0, the 
words in the terms of reference for this project say programs should ensure that 
government dollars are directed to areas of need with respect to income stabilization, 
disaster mitigation, insurance coverage and investment (emphasis ours).  As already 
suggested, nothing can be said about “investment” under either the proposed or current 
programs because the issue will not be addressed until 2006, and how it will be addressed 
is not known.  Moreover, there is a very strong feeling in the industry that investment 
should not be an aspect of an income stabilization policy.  Or said differently, the 
industry feels that farmers should not be expected to pay for public infrastructure out of 
their stabilization funds.  Hence we do not address this issue again. Nothing can be 
concluded. 
The remaining three (income stabilization, disaster mitigation and insurance coverage) 
are relatively broad and the list of possible sources of risk for crops, tree fruits, and 
livestock in the supporting documentation is so large it is daunting.  But, essentially, our 
perception is that the concern in policy is to protect farmers from uncontrollable losses in 
net farm income due to uncontrollable declines in prices of final products, uncontrollable 
increases in the prices of inputs, and uncontrollable shortfalls in production from disease, 
weather or other factors outside producers’ control.  Hence all three programs have three 
elements: crop (production) insurance to protect against physical disaster; an income 
stabilization program intended to protect against income shortfalls of up to 30%; and a An Assessment of the Proposed  
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disaster portion to protect against larger declines in income. The differences are the 
triggering mechanisms of the programs, the timing of the entitlements under the 
programs, and the breadth of production insurance instruments. 
Note that the emphasis is on “whole farm” income, not income from one or a set of 
products.  It would appear that this issue is closely related to the stabilization and equity 
issues.  Some would argue that there are problems if a program provides a different 
payout for two farms producing the same products, but having different private risk 
management programs.  Others would argue that if two farmers are producing the same 
product, but also producing different sets of other products, that a program should make 
the same payment to both farmers for the same product (at least on a per unit basis). Our 
interpretation of the intent of these programs is that they are intended to provide relief 
from a decline in whole farm net income.   
From this starting point then the question is whether one of the triggering mechanisms is 
better than another in terms of its sensitivity to a decline in farm income, and whether the 
crop or production insurance components are better.  The current program uses a gross 
margin calculated on a cash basis as a trigger for the NISA component as well as a gross 
margin calculated on a modified accrual basis for the CFIP component.  The proposed 
program, as well as the industry proposal, uses a Production Margin calculated on a 
modified accrual basis.   
4.1.1  Responsiveness of the Triggers  
Which program is more responsive to the risks against which programs are supposed to 
protect?  To begin with, conceptually, it would appear that the Production Margin is more 
responsive. This is because it specifically accounts for the factors that affect income risk 
– the level of production, prices of products, and prices of inputs. By simultaneously 
using the smallest possible number of variables to represent what is at risk, the 
Production Margin has less likelihood of being masked by something that is not related to 
the risks the programs are attempting to mitigate.    
For example, suppose input prices rise substantially in a given year.  Assuming that 
product prices and production don’t change, the increase in input prices would trigger a 
loss.  However, suppose in the same year, the farm has a decline in legal and accounting 
fees that offsets the rise in input prices.  With the Production Margin, a loss would be 
triggered.  With a gross margin, a loss would not be triggered.  Similarly, if the opposite 
situation occurred – i.e. in a given year the farm has a decline in input prices and an 
increase in legal and accounting - a payment may or may not be triggered.  But the farm 
will have a lower reference margin in the subsequent year if legal and accounting is an 
allowable expense.  Therefore, the farm is not able to benefit as much in subsequent years 
if there are uncontrollable changes in prices of products, prices of inputs or production.    
Some have argued that the Production Margin is a more appropriate trigger only when its 
variance is greater than the variance of the gross margin.  In the first place, since 
programs only trigger once per year, and that a few years can make a very significant 
difference to the aggregate outcome for an individual, basing conclusions on the An Assessment of the Proposed  
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assumptions of normal distributions may be limiting.  (Variations in my income may be 
normally distributed over 30 years, but if I can’t survive the three really bad ones early 
on, the other parts of the distribution may be quite academic.)  The Production Margin is 
much more responsive to current conditions with respect to the factors of interest.  
Second, we show in Appendix B that, as implied above, the real issue is the correlation 
between the eligible expenses and revenue.  As illustrated above, in the example of legal 
and accounting expenses, the eligible expenses in a production margin are likely to be 
more correlated with revenue.  In addition, the proposed measurement of Production 
Margin using a modified accrual basis should be more reflective of need as compared to 
the current NISA approach.  However, there has been a great deal of controversy over the 
method of valuing inventory as well as a greater risk of moral hazard.  We believe the 
risk of moral hazard can be overcome by simply adjusting inventory by a standardized 
price for the valuation of inventory.  This will remove individual discretion and increase 
the integrity of the process.  
A further aspect of the programs’ responsiveness to need is the fact that in the current 
NISA program and in the industry proposal, all producers were eligible to receive 
government deposits to their account based on 3% of ENS regardless of need, long term 
or short term.  With the proposed program, funds are only distributed based on ‘need’ 
using a margin comparison.  It is an important shift from the current program.  
One aspect of the design of the current program is the cap at $250,000 of ENS, while 
CFIP is capped at between $145,000 - $175,000 of benefits.  This places a ceiling on 
benefits for many farms, especially those with high turnovers such as livestock 
operations.  With the current program, this means that large losses, by definition, are not 
covered.   With the cap at $975,000 for the government proportion of total program 
payment, the proposed program will respond significantly better to the need of those with 
larger losses.  
The current program has two triggers that can be activated to provide withdrawal access: 
the gross margin trigger and the minimum income trigger (MIT).  The MIT is activated 
when gross margin in the current year falls below a threshold level.  The threshold is 
fixed and therefore is concerned with the absolute level (or adequacy) of the gross 
margin.  One could characterize the MIT as a form of support rather than stabilization.  
Regardless of the current year’s margin relative to the reference margin, the producer can 
trigger a payment to bring the margin back to the threshold level.  If a producer does not 
have a NISA account balance, then the amount triggered is limited to 3% of ENS to a 
maximum of $7500.  In effect, the MIT becomes a subsidy of 3% of ENS for those 
producers with a gross margin chronically below the threshold level. The proposed 
program does not have a similar component as it was designed to stabilize incomes rather 
than support them.   
The foregoing is the consensus of our project team based on examining program design.  
The analysis in a later section on the income stabilizing effects of the programs appears 
to bear out these conclusions. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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4.1.2  Labour As An Eligible Expense 
An important issue is whether to include labour as an eligible expense in the Production 
Margin.  There are two types of labour cost – arm’s length and non-arms length.  To date, 
the advice has been for non-arms length labour to not qualify as an eligible expense.  In 
other words, it is “in the margin”.  The rationale for this is that, for most farms, it is 
relatively fixed.  Another is that as an eligible expense it creates a moral hazard.   We 
concur with this and note that by including it in the margin, the reference margin is 
higher in the proposed program. 
It has been recommended that non-arms length labour cost be an eligible expense. 
Whether this is correct or not depends on whether increased labour costs represent a 
source of risk that a program should cover.  In turn, this likely depends on the nature of 
the farm business since it is unlikely that farm wage rates will vary uncontrollably (as 
opposed to trending upward).  For many farm operations, hired labour is relatively fixed 
from year to year and relatively “lumpy”.  Labour costs may go up in a year with a 
bumper crop that requires more help to deal with, or labour might be laid off if there is a 
crop failure.  In other words, there is likely either a direct or no correlation between 
revenue and labour costs.  In this case, from the farm’s perspective, it would be preferred 
that non-arm’s length labour be in the margin – i.e. if my revenue falls, I won’t be 
penalized in a claim year if I reduce my labour cost as I should, and I don’t want labour 
costs to mask the effects of the underlying hazard.  Conversely, in a good year I might 
have higher labour costs.  If it is not a deductible, then the reference margin is likely 
higher the following year, thereby increasing the farmer’s coverage. This also reduces the 
incentive for moral hazard. 
The problem is that, especially, many horticultural operations face the opposite situation 
because, with a poor crop, they often need to hire additional labour to salvage some value 
in the crop. In fact, a common part of crop insurance programs for horticultural crops is 
that farms must make every effort to salvage a crop and there is separate coverage for 
additional labour costs on the grounds that the insurer will likely pay less for additional 
labour cost than for additional crop loss.  For farms in this situation, one would expect a 
negative correlation between labour cost and revenue, and one would prefer that labour 
be an eligible expense.  If revenue declines because of a crop problem, Production 
Margin falls.  But it also falls with the increased labour costs; both are an aspect of 
production risk.  Therefore, the Production Margin would respond to both sources of 
need.   
Fundamentally, this discussion says that whether non-arm’s length labour should be 
included or excluded as an eligible expense depends on the nature of the farm operation, 
its structure and whether labour cost is positively or negatively correlated with revenue.  
Interestingly, we asked AAFC to provide information on this from the NISA database.  
Preliminary information suggests a negative correlation between hired labour cost and 
revenue for horticultural operations, and no or positive correlations for all other farm 
types. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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Another factor in this discussion is that an eligible expense by definition reduces the level 
of the reference margin and, therefore, the level of coverage available.  This compounds 
the problem for a farm with a positive correlation between revenue and labour cost – 
including labour as an eligible expense reduces the reference margin (i.e. the level of 
coverage) and reduces the payoff in a claim year.  All labour (both arms length and non-
arms length)
4 represents between 20% and 60% of the difference between the Gross 
Margin and Production Margin depending on commodity type
5.  
Clearly, this is not a simple problem for which there is a universal solution.  If possible, 
the best solution would be to let the program reflect reality, that is,  give farmers a one 
time (unless the nature of their operations change) choice of whether to include hired 
labour as an eligible expense.  This would clearly remove the problem.  If this is not 
administratively workable, then the fewest people would likely be negatively affected if 
arms length labour is an eligible deduction.  
4.1.3  The Trade Injury Issue 
As indicated in section 1.0, members of the industry have a major reservation about the 
proposed program because of the argument that they should be compensated for trade 
injury – i.e. the effects of foreign subsidies. Trade injuries happen in at least two ways – 
relatively short term injury caused by a short-term policy or event such as dumping; or 
more systemic issues that create lower prices because of ongoing subsidies in a foreign 
country.  The systemic issue would arise if the foreign country’s policies distort market 
signals and draw too many resources into production of a certain product or products.  In 
turn, this drags down world prices and Canadian producers are injured systemically. 
We would argue that all three proposals deal with the first type of injury. As discussed 
above, a Production Margin trigger is more sensitive, and should be more responsive to 
this type of injury.  
The systemic problem is a problem in all three proposals.  Almost by definition, an 
effective stabilization program will not be an effective tool for systemic trends.  If foreign 
subsidies bring down product prices over time, this will erode the reference margin, and 
the level of the trigger for those who produce affected products will fall.  We addressed 
this by examining some alternative margin scenarios.  Not surprisingly, as product prices 
fall over time, the program that has the most positive impact for farmers is the one that 
has the highest component of government money in it. But it says nothing conclusive 
about which triggering mechanism is better.  One can make up examples that prove any 
point one wants to prove. 
                                                 
4 The data weren’t immediately available to separate arm’s length and non-arm’s length.   
5 Table B-2 in Appendix B presents a detailed breakdown if the differences between Gross Margin and 
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One small exception should be noted, the current NISA program provides for a payment 
of 3% of Eligible Net Sales (or up to a maximum of $7,500) in the case of a minimum 
income trigger. This would provide some minimal level of support (albeit eroding over 
time as ENS erodes from trade injury) to small producers.  This support, however, is very 
small and insufficient to provide viable assistance to commercial producers being 
affected by trade injury or to sustain a small producer with reoccurring low income over 
the long run. 
In our view, the bottom line is that the systemic trade injury issue is not one that can be 
resolved with a stabilization program.  All a stabilization program can do is assist those 
affected with a transition to some other production opportunity if foreign subsidies 
remove those opportunities one is currently pursuing.   
4.1.4 Affordability 
Questions have been raised regarding whether farmers can afford the proposed programs 
as compared to the current programs.  There are several aspects of this issue.  The first is 
cash flow. The deposit required to participate in the current NISA program is 3% of 
Eligible Net Sales (ENS).  If one assumes that the Production Margin is 50% of ENS (an 
assumption that is within the range observed in the real farm data), then the deposit 
would be 6% of the Production Margin.  In the first year a producer participates in the 
proposed program, the required deposit is one third of 14% or 4.67% - less than the 
deposit amount required under the current NISA program.  Moreover, in the current 
NISA the 3% deposit is required each year whereas, once a producer has deposited the 
full 14%, no further deposits are required until a claim is made under the proposed New 
NISA 
In exchange for the smaller deposit, the producer receives 70% coverage of his or her 
Production Margin whereas under the current programs the producer receives coverage 
equivalent to double the deposit amount plus the CFIP coverage of 49% of the Gross 
Margin (70% of the decline below 70%) less the NISA adjustment of 6% of ENS.  When 
one considers that the Gross Margin is typically 40% to 60% of the Production Margin, it 
is clear that a producer receives significantly more downside protection under the 
proposed program for a smaller impact on cash flow. For example, the producer with 
$100,000 production margin and 70% of coverage, would be eligible for up to $56,000 in 
government funds with the proposed program versus $31,000 with the current program in 
the first year.  Under the current program, producers also are eligible for the disaster 
portion.  Therefore, a question remains around what level of coverage a producer will 
choose.  Is an assumption of 70% coverage likely?  Analysis of the distribution of margin 
declines in the NISA dataset shows that over 70% of the declines are less than 40% of 
production margin and the producer will be returned to 100% of the reference production 
margin with 70% coverage.  Furthermore, when the aggregate payout was compared to 
the aggregate margin decline, the aggregate payout was between 96.2% and 99% of the 
aggregate margin decline when producers selected 70% coverage.   
Therefore, it is difficult to believe that many producers will put an additional 12% of 
production margin on deposit to access the last 1-3% of benefit (especially when one An Assessment of the Proposed  
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considers that the cap on government payouts at 70% of the decline limits the total 
payout to less than 100% of the aggregate margin decline even when a producer selects 
100% coverage).   
In addition to all of the foregoing, preliminary discussions with lenders indicates that, as 
a general rule, they would lend the deposit to producers and not make the loan part of an 
operating line.  This is because the program provides protection to the lender through the 
protection it provides to producers.  Thus, the maximum cost to producers would be the 
net interest paid on the deposit (cost of borrowing less deposit interest earned).   
4.2 Equal  Treatment 
As indicated in section 3.0, the objective of equal treatment is achieved if producers with 
the same risk in two different places are treated the same way by a program when they 
have a risk. This is closely related to the need issue: if we both have an uncontrollable 
loss, will we be treated the same under the program?  Since the proposed program 
triggers payments based on loss while the existing and industry proposals trigger them (at 
the initial levels) by sales, then by definition the proposed comes closer to meeting this 
objective. In the disaster portion, the programs are conceptually similar except for the 
nature of the margin calculation.  
Moreover, in the strict sense of this objective, as compared to the current situation where 
producers in different provinces and different commodities have access to different 
companion programs, the proposed program represents a definite step towards improved 
“equality” of treatment for producers across the country and across commodities, as we 
understand equality of treatment.  However, there are still several; situations where 
producers with similar risk situations will be treated differently. 
First, crop insurance is provided for some commodities.  It provides negative margin 
coverage that isn’t available to producers of crops for which crop insurance does not 
exist.  As well, crop insurance mitigates risk at the specific commodity level rather than 
the whole farm level.  The new business risk management framework proposes extending 
“production” insurance to a significantly wider range of commodities than currently are 
covered.  However, specific analysis of the stabilization effect of crop insurance under 
the new programs was not conducted since the exact nature and coverage of the proposed 
new production insurance programs is unknown.  
The payouts from crop insurance will be added into a producer’s income before the 
margin decline and eligibility for payment is calculated as it is with the current program.  
Depending on the degree of the decline it is possible that a producer will substitute 50% 
coverage of the loss (crop insurance payout) for 80% coverage of the loss (proposed 
program payout).  The only time a producer would be indifferent between crop insurance 
and the proposed program is in the top stabilization layer where the matching is identical.  
Thus, producers with similar losses will be treated differently depending on whether they 
are enrolled in crop insurance. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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The degree to which the variability of the Production Margin is an adequate proxy for the 
risks faced by an operation will vary across commodities.  The relative importance and 
variability of expense items varies between commodity types and the degree of 
substitution of items in and out of the margin varies as well.  Labour is the obvious 
example.  It is a significantly larger portion of expenses on a horticultural operation as 
compared to other commodities and is the only commodity where labour tends to be 
negatively correlated with income.  Thus, the potential exists for Production Margin to be 
a poorer proxy for cash flow risk in some commodities than others.  It would be 
interesting and informative to examine whether the program preference decision is the 
same across all commodities if the stabilization of gross margin is the decision metric 
used instead of the stabilization of production margin.  
The distribution and pattern of losses over a short time period will influence the degree of 
support received by a commodity.  The majority of agricultural commodities have price 
cycles.  Those commodities with price cycles longer than the five-year reference period 
will have their reference margins influenced by the price cycle of the commodity.  
Similarly, because the caps are different under the proposed programs, some producers 
will be eligible for coverage of larger losses than under the current program.  This will 
likely change the distribution of payments among commodity groups.   
While we have indicated that the proposed program meets the test of equal treatment as 
defined, there is clearly number of instances in which  it changes the distribution of 
benefits.  These changes may be interpreted by some as changes in the “equity” of the 
program.   
4.3 Minimize  distortion 
As indicated in section 3.0, the major issue here is whether the bundles of programs mask 
market signals or cause farmers to produce certain products or make different production 
or management decisions.   
Because the proposed program reduces the number of companion programs targeted at 
individual commodities, by definition it reduces the distortion of market signals. 
Additionally, the program stabilizes a producer’s own margin, which is a function of 
market prices, and therefore rewards and penalizes decisions the same as the marketplace 
does over time and in a manner similar to existing programs. 
There are two areas where the proposed program reduces the distortions caused by the 
current NISA program.  By calculating the Production Margin on an accrual basis, the 
incentive to make decisions that would maximize a payout in any given year but not 
necessarily maximize income over the longer term is significantly reduced.  Secondly, the 
removal of off-farm income from the calculations eliminates the disincentive to self-
stabilize with off-farm income in the current NISA program. 
Inherent in any program that attempts to stabilize income is a distortion that provides 
greater reward to riskier behaviour.  Both the old and new programs penalize self-An Assessment of the Proposed  
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stabilizing behaviour by providing greater support to producers with greater variability in 
income.  The effect is less obvious in the current NISA program.  If two producers have 
the same average ENS, they are eligible to build the same coverage levels under the 
current NISA regardless of the standard deviations of their income streams.  However, 
the producer with the greater variability in income will likely access the funds sooner.  
An example of this effect may be enrolment in crop insurance.  With the exception of 
insurable events that cause a negative Production Margin, a producer will generally 
receive equivalent or greater government compensation for a loss without crop insurance 
than with insurance.  Thus, one might expect fewer producers to enroll in crop insurance 
under the proposed New Program.  However, the results from the data provided were 
inconclusive on this point.  On some metrics, in some models the producer would prefer 
to be enrolled in crop insurance as greater stability was observed. However, there were 
sufficient contradictory events to prevent drawing a conclusion. Regardless, we 
understand that part of the new program design will be to create a linkage between crop 
insurance and the New Program such that producers will not be dissuaded from 
continuing their risk reduction behaviour of enrolling in crop insurance. 
Finally, the Minimum Income Trigger (MIT) has a greater potential to distort farmers’ 
production and marketing decisions than the stabilization trigger in the proposed 
program.  To a certain extent, the MIT will mask market signals to discontinue an 
unsustainable enterprise. 
4.4  Entire Farm Risks Stabilized 
All three sources of analysis − NISA farm data, model farm simulations, and real farm 
data − were examined to compare the stabilization impact of both the proposed “New” 
NISA program and the Industry proposal to the current programs. 
Inherent in any empirical analysis is an assumption regarding the definition of “risk” and 
the corresponding definition of “stabilization”.  The widely accepted view is that a 
stabilization program should minimise the negative effect of unforeseeable and 
uncontrollable events on a producer’s income.  Thus, measuring the semi-variance of the 
income stream, or a proxy thereof, is a widely used measure of the effectiveness of 
stabilization programs.  Semi-variance is a similar measure to standard deviation except 
that it only examines the variation of the distribution below the mean.  A lower semi-
variance implies less variation of income below the mean.  Use of semi-variance as a 
measure of stabilization implies that a producer is primarily concerned with the variation 
of income on the downside and any shift of the mean is inconsequential to the 
stabilization effect of a program.  However, one can argue that in the case where one 
program has a higher semi-variance and a higher mean income relative to another 
program it is difficult to determine which program should be preferred.  Government 
stabilization programs, by their very nature, impact both the mean and the variation of the 
income distribution.  It would be interesting to examine other decision metrics that 
consider a program’s impact on the mean as well as its impact on variation.  A possible 
alternative would be to calculate the semi-variance against the mean of the unstabilized An Assessment of the Proposed  
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distribution rather than the mean of the stabilized distribution.  By using this alternative 
calculation, both the reduction in variation and how close to the original mean the 
distribution is truncated would be factored into the decision metric.  
The primary metric used to measure the stabilization effect of each program in each 
analysis provided by AAFC was semi-variance of the Production Margin.  For the real 
farm data, the semi-variance of the gross margin was also examined and found to produce 
the same decision when comparing the proposed programs to the current programs.  This 
is an important result because it implies that using the production margin as the triggering 
mechanism results, as would be preferred, in greater stability of net income.  This 
inference follows from the fact that, because more costs are deducted from revenue in the 
gross margin, it is a closer measure of net income.  It is not likely that one can truly 
model the final effects on net income because it is also affected by the capital structure of 
the farm - ie interest and depreciation. In turn, this means that one needs the farm’s 
balance sheet, as well as its profit and loss statement.  More importantly, one would need 
to know what decisions the farmer would make about investment and borrowing under 
different circumstances.  Making assumptions about these things would determine the 
results of the analysis.  Using gross margin as a proxy incorporates fewer opportunities 
for bias.  
Table 4.1 presents a summary of an analysis of the semi-variance of the Production 
Margin for various commodity groups when the new program was simulated using the 
NISA farm dataset.   
 
 


















All Farms  16,426 10,092 13,431 1.000 0.614 0.818
Grains and 
Oilseeds
64,398 13,493 7,470 10,504 1.000 0.554 0.778
Cattle 20,380 14,892 9,573 12,276 1.000 0.643 0.824
Other 10,693 23,605 17,145 21,199 1.000 0.726 0.898
Fruit, Vegetable 
and Potato
4,951 32,123 23,694 29,710 1.000 0.738 0.925
Hogs 3,038 38,024 22,160 29,353 1.000 0.583 0.772
Semi-Variance
Production Margin
Semi Variance - 
IndexAn Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
     
May 2, 2003                     Page 31
While only the Canada summary is presented here, a similar result was found when 
examining each of the provinces individually, only low margin farms, only high margin 
farms, only small farms and only large farms. 
Similarly, the model farm simulations and the real farm analysis showed lower semi-
variances from the proposed program as compared to the current programs. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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Table 4.2:  Comparison of Semi-Variance on the Model Farms 
  Current Semi-Variance  Proposed Program Semi-Variance 
Ontario Grain and Oilseed  27,723  21,049 
Ontario Hog  16,993*  18,668 
Saskatchewan Grain and Oilseed  33,742  26,095 
Alberta Cattle  6,988  5,191 
Manitoba Grain and Oilseed  35,078  31,978 
 
NOTE:  *This result may be an artefact of the large beginning balance that was modelled 
for this farm.  Because of the large initial balance, the farm can trigger 
payments under the current program which are larger than the actual loss, 
creating an “over stabilization”.  If the farms were to be modelled with $0 




Table 4.3: Summary of Semi-Variance Analysis of the Production Margin (Industry 
Proposal) 
 
Again, the results are presented for the entire Canadian dataset, but the result of a greater 
stabilization impact for the industry proposal relative to the current programs holds 















All Farms 103,460 16,426 10,386 13,431 1.000 0.632 0.818
Grains and 
Oilseeds
64,398 13,493 7,831 10,504 1.000 0.580 0.778
Cattle 20,380 14,892 9,013 12,276 1.000 0.605 0.824
Other 10,693 23,605 18,215 21,199 1.000 0.772 0.898
Fruit, Vegetable 
And Potato
4,951 32,123 24,813 29,710 1.000 0.772 0.925
Hog 3,038 38,024 22,696 29,353 1.000 0.597 0.772
Semi Variance - 
Index
Semi Variance - 
Contribution Margin Number of 
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No firm conclusions can be drawn about the relative stabilization impact of the industry 
proposal compared to the AAFC proposed program as the relative stabilization impact 
varies by commodity and region.  However, in the NISA data modelling across all time 
periods, the cost to the government of achieving the stabilization impact was significantly 
higher than in the AAFC proposal.  Thus, when one considers the fact that when all farms 
are taken in aggregate, the AAFC proposal provides marginally greater stabilization 
impact at a materially lower cost, one should conclude that the current AAFC proposal is 
preferred from an efficiency point of view.   
4.5 Simplicity 
The objective of simplicity is to ensure programs do not create an unnecessary 
administrative burden on participants, increase costs of compliance (for example through 
accounting and legal fees), discourage participation or result in exorbitant administrative 
costs. In addition the program should be easy to understand so producers can make 
informed decisions on their own use of the program. 
Currently, producers are required to undertake the administration related to at minimum 
two programs (NISA and CFIP) in order to receive stabilization and disaster protection.  
In the case of grains and oilseeds farmers and some horticulture producers, there is the 
additional requirement of Crop Insurance in order to have production insurance and 
negative margin coverage as well.  Finally in some provinces, there may be additional 
administrative requirements for some producers to participate in the various companion 
programs in order to receive the fullest risk management protection available to them. 
The move to a single program to replace CFIP, Companion Programs and current NISA 
clearly reduces the administrative burden for both producers and governments. 
Over time the NISA program has evolved to allow ease of application for partnerships 
and proprietors by integrating more directly with the income tax filing system. The plan 
to continue and enhance the linkage to income tax filing for the proposed New NISA 
should ensure more simplicity. On the other hand, the CFIP program has been more 
complicated administratively for several reasons.  First, data on production and valuation 
over time is required for accrual adjustments.  This often created significant difficulties 
for producers who did not maintain this data on an annual basis as part of their normal 
operating procedures.  This means that in a year where the producer believes he might be 
eligible for a claim, he has to go back and try to establish all the relevant data historically 
in order to apply for program funding.  In some cases, significant support from an 
accountant is required.  Furthermore, producers often had to complete the full application 
form before they could assess whether they were eligible for program funding.  In some 
cases, producers would incur the accounting costs only to find out that they were not 
eligible for program funding. 
Since the proposed New NISA program operates on a continuous basis the challenges of 
“recreating” historical data are eliminated in exchange for some incremental work each 
year.  Furthermore by providing data on an annual basis a producer does not risk the 
situation that could occur with CFIP where they were unable to obtain coverage because An Assessment of the Proposed  
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they had not maintained the necessary historical data.  That said, for a producer who has 
traditionally only participated in the current NISA program the accrual adjustment 
information that will be required under the proposed New NISA will represent an 
increased administrative burden. The government should put significant attention into 
simplifying the way they calculate payments. 
In the current program, because NISA has a relatively low cap for contribution levels it is 
not uncommon for farming operations to have multiple NISA accounts in order to 
achieve coverage levels that are appropriate for the size of their operation.  This increases 
administration costs to both producers and governments.  The increase in program cap 
under the proposed New NISA will allow producers to operate under only one account. 
Finally, the move to a single program to replace NISA and CFIP will make it easier for a 
producer to understand the farm’s risk position and protection since determining 
entitlement under the proposed program will not require an understanding of two separate 
program calculations and their linkages. 
4.6  Long Term Planning 
It is important that any risk management program made available to farmers supports the 
management objective of long term planning.  It is critical that it allow producers to 
objectively make production and investment decisions for the long-term benefit of their 
operation. A key element of this is to help provide sufficient stability to the farming 
operation to support their access to borrowed capital for long term investment purposes.   
As discussed above under the section on simplicity, the proposed program will be easier 
to understand and provide producers with a better year-to-year perspective on their level 
of risk and coverage.  This in itself supports long term planning and investment decisions 
since producers and bankers both better understand the farm’s position. 
Because the proposed new program provides full coverage from year one without the 
need to build up account balances as in the current NISA program, it provides better 
support for expansion and investment.  This is particularly relevant for beginning 
producers who in the past have had very limited support since they have not had 
sufficient time to build up a balance for protection in their NISA account.  This is further 
exacerbated if there has been pressure on margins in the early years of their operation, 
thereby not allowing them the ability to build up balances in their account.  
There has been much discussion regarding the reaction of banks to the proposed new 
program. Overall we believe that it will be easier for lenders to understand the level of 
risk support being provided to the farming operation and thus the bank’s exposure under 
the new program. Furthermore, overall the program provides a major reduction in risk to 
producers.  Consequently, it is difficult to imagine why a financial institution would not 
want to support a producer in meeting his deposit requirement to participate fully in the 
proposed new program, since it only reduces the bank’s risk exposure.  An Assessment of the Proposed  
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In the current NISA program, producers must continually deposit funds to their account 
in order to receive the matching government contribution.  Under the proposed new 
program producers do not have to continue deposits once they have reached their full 
deposit level (after three years). This means that once producers have reached the full 
deposit level they no longer are required to trade-off the relative merit of additional 
investment in NISA versus directly in their farming operation. 
In addition for any producers with balances in their current NISA account, these funds 
would become available to provide the capital for deposit requirements under the 
proposed new program. The NISA Consultation document released in 2001 indicated that 
over 60% of participants had sufficient balances to cover more than 30% of their 
reference margin.  Since the Production Margin generally ranges from 1.5 to 2.5 times 
the NISA reference margin, this would indicate that approximately 60% of producers will 
access sufficient capital in the close out of their current NISA accounts to fully fund the 
deposit required for 70% coverage under the new program. 
The proposed program includes a structural adjustment component that will allow the 
Production Margin to scale with changes in the size of an operation. This means that 
producers who are in the process of expanding their operations will be eligible for 
coverage relative to their new risk level, not their historic levels. This provides an 
important element of support for long-term investment and access to capital.  
Alternatively, producers downscaling their operations in preparation for retirement can 
reduce their coverage levels to reflect the lower risk exposure they have, freeing up funds 
for other transition related need. While the exact details of the method for implementing 
the structural adjustment component are still being developed, in concept, it is an 
important improvement relative to the current NISA program and similar to the 
provisions of the CFIP program.  
Finally the requirement to provide accrual data on an annual basis in order to participate 
in the Proposed program (as opposed to CFIP where it is provided sporadically) could 
encourage better farm management and improved decision making by some producers 
since they should become more fully aware of their true financial performance. This is a 
very positive element of program design. 
4.7  Needs of Supply Management Sectors 
As discussed above, the needs for stabilization and disaster relief for supply managed 
commodities do not derive from output price volatility.  Instead, the need for stabilization 
and disaster protection derives from production related perils, such as animal disease, 
catastrophic mortality, and product spoilage losses.  These perils are currently protected 
against under CFIP.  However, CFIP only covers losses of more than 30%, i.e. if a supply 
managed farm has a loss of 40%, it can only be compensated back to a 30% loss.  
A second source of need for a farm that produces supply managed products is losses that 
occur on non-supply managed products that it also produces.  Under the current program, An Assessment of the Proposed  
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non-supply managed enterprises on a farm that also has supply management can 
participate in NISA, but only if they are separated from the supply managed enterprises. 
Under the proposed program, a loss of more than 30% would be covered back to 100% of 
the reference margin, the amount of the farmer’s deposit, or to a point where no more 
than 70% of the loss is covered by government, whichever is less.  In other words, if the 
total loss is greater than 30%, a supply managed enterprise obtains more coverage than 
under the current program. 
As with the current program, a supply managed farm with losses less 30% is eligible for 
compensation, but only for the portion of the farm that is not supply managed.  
These distinctions are made because of legal opinions obtained by AAFC that the 
distinction between “green” and “amber” payments under the WTO is based on the 
farmer’s loss, not the nature of the payment.  In other words, the opinion is that any 
payment to a farm with a loss greater than 30% of the reference margin is green, even if 
part of the payment restores the loss to less than 30%.  If the loss is less than 30% of the 
reference, then any payment is regarded as amber.  It should be noted, however, that the 
supply managed industries have expressed concern about the potential impact on their 
supply management programs should these interpretations prove incorrect. 
We were not presented with data or research related to supply managed industries.  Thus, 
the analysis of the proposed program in the context of supply management proceeds only 
on a conceptual basis.   
•  The proposed program is a clear improvement on CFIP in protecting against 
production losses.  
•  The proposed program should be at least as beneficial to non-supply managed 
commodities produced on farms with supply managed commodities as the current 
program. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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5.0 Conclusions 
Need, Are Government Dollars Directed Correctly 
Need is defined as protecting farmers from uncontrollable decreases in farm income due 
to declines in prices of final products, increases in the prices of inputs and shortfalls in 
production from disease, weather, etcetera. Since all three programs (current, proposed 
and industry) have elements of crop (production) insurance, disaster and stabilization, the 
relative merit of each program is based on the differences in triggering mechanisms, 
timing of payments and breadth of protection. In this regard we observe the following. 
With respect to responsiveness: 
•  Production Margin (Proposed New NISA) is more responsive to income declines than 
gross margin (current NISA) since the Production Margin contains those expense 
components that are less directly correlated to production. 
•  The modified accrual approach used in the Production Margin can be more reflective 
of need if appropriate inventory valuation standards are enforced. 
•  The shift to government fund contributions or payments only at the time of income 
decline (proposed program) instead of annually (current NISA) means funds are 
distributed based on income need not to program participants at large.   
•  The increase in cap under the new proposed program significantly increases 
responsiveness to need for the livestock sector and larger operations in general. 
With respect to treatment of labour expenses: 
•  With the exception of horticulture (where labour can be negatively correlated to 
revenue for salvage situations), the inclusion of labour in the Production Margin 
encourages the reduction of labour expense where possible in a year of revenue 
decline, without penalizing the producer from receiving needed stabilization support. 
•  Inclusion of labour in the Eligible Expenses (i.e. Not in the Production Margin) 
reduces the reference margin thereby reducing the level of coverage provided to 
producers. Accordingly all producers (including horticulture) benefit from greater 
coverage levels when labour is included in the Production Margin. 
•  Because of the complexity of this expense, one option would be to allow producers a 
one time selection (at time of initial program enrolment) of whether arms length 
labour will be included or not in their margin calculations. 
With respect to trade injury effects: 
•  All three programs deal well with short term injury caused by such events as dumping 
or single year subsidy programs. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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•  None of the three programs will address the systemic issue of long term price erosion 
resulting from foreign agriculture and trade policies since the programs are all 
fundamentally designed as stabilization rather than support programs. 
•  The presence of the stabilization program however does provide stability to producers 
choosing to switch from a product or commodity facing on-going trade injury to 
one(s) not affected. 
With respect to equality of treatment: 
•  As compared to the current situation where producers in different provinces and 
different commodities have access to different companion programs, the proposed 
program represents a definite step toward improved “equality” of treatment of 
producers across the country and across commodities. 
•  The nature and availability of production (crop) insurance coverage affects equity.  
Since crop insurance payments are deducted from payments under the new program, 
in some cases producers will substitute 50% coverage for 80% and 70% coverage that 
is provided in the Proposed New NISA.  Only in the case of the top layer of the 
proposed new program are producers indifferent to their source of protection. 
•  The degree to which the variability of the Production Margin is an adequate proxy for 
the risks faced by an operation will vary across commodities.  Accordingly, the 
potential exists for Production Margin to be a poorer proxy for risk in some 
commodities compared to others.  In general, however, equality of treatment should 
be greater within commodities. 
•  Since the distribution and pattern of losses over a short time period will influence the 
degree of support received by a commodity, those commodities with price cycles 
longer than the five year reference margin will have their level of margin support 
affected (either negatively or positively) depending on the length of the cycle and 
position in the cycle. 
•  While the proposed program meets the test of equal treatment as defined, there is 
clearly a number of instances where it changes the distribution of benefits.  These 
changes may be interpreted by some as changes in the “equity” of the program.   
Minimize Distortion 
The objective of minimizing distortion is directed at reducing the tendency of producers 
to undertake activities they otherwise would not undertake if the program was not in 
place.  In other words assuring that producers do not change decisions on what and how 
to operate their business as a result of the program.  This infers that the program should 
not mask normal market signals to producers nor encourage different risk behaviours than 
would be the norm. In this regard, we observe the following: An Assessment of the Proposed  
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•  Because the proposed program reduces the number of companion programs targeted 
at individual commodities, by definition, it reduces the distortion of market signals. 
•  Because the proposed program stabilizes a producer’s own margin and therefore 
rewards and penalizes decisions the same as the marketplace does, it reduces 
distortion. 
•  By calculating the Production Margin (proposed program) on an accrual basis, the 
incentive to maximize payout in a given year but not necessarily maximize income 
over the longer term is significantly reduced. 
•  By including capital related elements in the Production Margin (Machinery and 
Building Repairs and Maintenance) there is no incentive to distort investment in 
capital that may not be appropriate. 
•  The removal of off-farm income from the calculations in the proposed new program 
eliminates the disincentive to self-stabilize through off farm income as is the case 
with the current program. 
•  Both current and proposed programs have some tendency to reward riskier behaviour.  
In the current program, riskier producers may access funds sooner. On the other hand 
in the proposed program the self stabilizing producer cannot “bank” the benefits of 
his less risky behaviour. 
•  While the data were not at all conclusive it is possible that there could be a tendency 
for a crop producer with limited risk of negative Production Margins to eliminate or 
reduce crop insurance in their basket of risk management tools and use only the 
proposed New NISA program. 
Entire Farm Income Risks Stabilized 
All three sources of analysis − NISA farm data, model farm simulations, and “real” farm 
data − were examined to compare the stabilization impact of both the proposed New 
NISA program and the Industry proposal to the current programs.  In all three cases, the 
measure of stability used was semi-variance. To judge the stabilizing effects, semi-
variances of Production Margins are measured in the aggregate NISA farm data, but we 
also compared semi-variances on gross margins of the “real” farms. Gross margins are 
the best proxy for net farm incomes.  The results are the same in both cases – i.e. what 
provides the most stability in the Production Margins of the NISA data also provides the 
most stability in the gross margins of  “real” farms. In this regard we observe the 
following.  
•  The proposed program provides more income stability than the current program in all 
three sets of analysis. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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•  The proposed program consistently provides more stability than the current program 
when the aggregate NISA farms are disaggregated by type of farm, region, size of 
farm, or size of margin.   
•  The version of the industry proposal that was analysed resulted in better measures of 
stability for some industries and disaggregations than does the proposed program.  
However, the cost of that version would be quite high, significantly greater than the 
proposed new program..  Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn about the 
stabilizing impact of the industry program.   
Simplicity 
The objective of simplicity is to ensure programs do not create an unnecessary 
administrative burden on participants, increase costs of compliance (for example through 
accounting and legal fees), discourage participation or result in exorbitant administrative 
costs. In addition the program should be easy to understand so producers can make 
informed decisions on their own use of the program.  In this regard we observe the 
following: 
•  The move to a single program to replace CFIP, Companion Programs and current 
NISA reduces the administrative burden for both producers and governments. 
•  The objective to continue and enhance the linkage to income tax filing for the 
proposed program supports simplicity. 
•  The increase in caps to allow producers to operate under only one account in the 
proposed reduces the burden of multiple NISA accounts that are used by large 
producers currently. 
•  The proposed program makes it easier to understand the farm’s entitlement under the 
program since it does not require an understanding of two separate program 
calculations and their linkages. 
•  The proposed program operates on a continuous basis. This means producers do not 
need to invest in determining whether there is a benefit to applying in a given year as 
is the case for CFIP.  Furthermore by providing data on an annual basis a producer 
does not risk the situation that could occur with CFIP where they were unable to 
obtain coverage because they had not maintained the necessary historical data (such 
as year end inventory levels and values). 
Long Term Planning 
The objective of long term planning is to allow producers to objectively make production 
and investment decisions for the long term benefit of their operation. In addition the goal 
is to provide sufficient stability to support access to capital for long term investment 
purposes.  In this regard we observe the following: An Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
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•  Since it is easier to understand your risk position and entitlements in the proposed 
New NISA program as compared to current NISA and CFIP, producers can naturally 
make better long term planning and investment decisions. 
•  Because the proposed new program provides full coverage from year one without the 
need to build up account balances as in the current NISA program, it better supports 
expansion and investment (particularly for beginning producers).  
•  Lenders are better able to understand the level of risk support being provided to the 
farming operation and thus the bank’s exposure. This should result in the provision of 
the full deposit requirement by financial institutions since it reduces their risk 
exposure. 
•  Once producers have reached the full deposit level (after three years) they no longer 
are required to trade-off the relative merit of additional investment in NISA versus 
directly in their farming operation. 
•  The proposed program includes a structural adjustment component that will allow the 
Production Margin to scale with changes in the size of an operation. While the exact 
details of the structural adjustment are still being developed, in concept, it is an 
improvement relative to the current NISA program. 
•  Finally the requirement to provide accrual data on an annual basis in order to 
participate in the proposed New NISA program (as opposed to CFIP where it is 
provided sporadically) could encourage better farm management and improved 
decision making by some producers since they should become more fully aware of 
their true financial performance. 
Supply Managed Industries Participation in Programs 
While supply managed commodities have an alternative mechanism for managing the 
risk of an uncontrollable decline in price, they are still subject to margin risks from an 
uncontrollable decrease in production or an uncontrollable increase in input costs.  
Supply managed commodities have received differing treatment under the current suite of 
programs − they are not eligible for NISA but are eligible under CFIP.  In this regard we 
observe the following. 
•  The proposed new program is a clear improvement over the current suite of programs 
since it will provide coverage for margin declines of less than 30% and provides 
greater coverage of margin declines greater than 30% relative to current programs.  
As well, the move from a gross margin to a Production Margin provides for a greater 
base of coverage. 
•  The eligibility of the whole farm will provide for equal treatment of operations with 
both supply managed and non-supply managed commodities as compared to those 
farms with only non-supply managed commodities.  This is an improvement over the 
current situation where farms producing both types of commodities do not receive An Assessment of the Proposed  
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equivalent treatment to their counterparts with only non-supply managed 
commodities under the NISA program as a result of the method of calculating eligible 
sales and eligible expenses. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Our review has, as requested, focused on comparing the expected performance of the 
proposed risk management programs (Proposed New NISA and Crop Insurance) to the 
current programs (NISA, CFIP, and Companion Programs) and the Industry Proposal.  
The analysis has been done on the basis of six of the seven objectives established by the 
Federal and Provincial Ministers of Agriculture (need, equal treatment, distortion 
minimization, whole farm stabilization, simplicity and long term planning). We note two 
important points.  
 
First we did not assess the acceptability of the program within WTO Agriculture 
Guidelines.  This concern was raised a number of times in the course of our work.  It is 
important and we encourage its investigation and analysis. 
 
Secondly only limited analysis of the industry proposal was possible given the early 
stages of its design.  However, in its current form, it is clear from the analysis that it is 
not financially viable within the safety nets funding envelope. 
 
We conclude that while the proposed new program has advantages and disadvantages 
compared to the current programs, on balance, it is clear to us that the proposed new 
programs better achieve the six objectives of business risk management as agreed to by 
the Federal and Provincial Ministers in Whitehorse. 
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Appendix A:  Analytical Framework 
Objective  Data/Information Source  Activity 
1. Need for 
stabilization 
- “Logic Model and 
Communications Approach 
for Risk Management” 
document 
- Scenario simulations 
-  Consider the empirical 
evidence on the 11 sources 
of risk documented have 
been identified  
-   Consider variance in total 
support under current 
programs, and proposed 
program 
1. Need for disaster 
protection  
- Scenario simulations  - Consider minimum incomes 
under current programs, 
and proposed program 
1. Need for safety net 
as insurance 
-“Logic Model and 
Communications Approach 
for Risk Management” 
document 
- Scenario simulations 
- Consider the empirical 
evidence on the 9 producer 
and 3 government 
expectations that have been 
identified 
-  Consider variance in 
income under current 
programs, and proposed 
program 
2. Equity in treatment  - “Logic Model and 
Communications Approach 
for Risk Management” 
document 
- Description of expense items  
- Scenario simulations 
- Analysis of income variation 
- Discussions with program 
administrators 
-  Interpret the proposed 
program design in the 
context of the intensity 
(size, capital/labour) and 
risks in each farm type and 
region 
-  Interpret rationale for 
inclusion/exclusion of 
specific cost items under 
proposed program 
-  Consider the relative 
variance in stabilized 
income and support under 
the alternative programs  An Assessment of the Proposed  
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Objective  Data/Information Source  Activity 
3. Minimization of  
distortions 
- “Logic Model and 
Communications Approach 
for Risk Management” 
document 
- Description of expense items  
-  Interpret the design of the 
proposed program in the 
context of the incentives 
conveyed or masked 
-  Interpret the design of the 
proposed program in the 
context of production-
related moral hazard 
-  Consider the apparent tax 
implications of the 
proposed program 
4. Focus on 
management of risks 
related to the whole 
farm and to avoids 
duplication of 
payments 
- Description of expense items 
- Scenario simulations 
- Analysis of income variation 
-  Interpret program design to 
assess whether specific 
sources of risk are 
cushioned to a greater 
extent than overall income 
risk  
-  Consider which revenue and 
expense components 
warrant cushioning. 
-  Consider variance in 
income under no safety net, 
current programs, proposed 
program 
5. Relatively simple 
and easy to 
understand 
- Application forms for 
existing programs 
- Discussions with 
administrators of current 
programs 
-  Interpret the procedures 
involved in applying to the 
proposed program and 
processing applications 
relative to the current 
program 
-  Interpret rationale for 
inclusion/exclusion of 
specific cost items under 
proposed program 
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Objective  Data/Information Source  Activity 
6. Facilitates long term 
planning by farmers. 
- Description of expense items 
- Scenario simulations 
- Analysis of income variation 
-  Interpret program design in 
the context of incentives to 
consider market signals 
-  Interpret program design in 
the context of farm 
expansions 
-  Consider variance in 
income under no safety net, 
current programs, proposed 
program 
-  Consider variance in 
income under no safety net, 
current programs, proposed 
program 
 
 An Assessment of the Proposed  
New Risk Management Programs 
     
May 2, 2003                     Page 46
Appendix B:  Production Margin Relative to Gross Margin as Safety Net 
Stability Concepts 
Under either the proposed program or the program proposed by industry, production margin is 
maintained as a stabilization concept.  This replaces the gross margin concept that is applied 
under the current NISA and CFIP programs.  Production margin is calculated as  
Production margin = Eligible Revenue – Eligible Expenses(a) + Accrual Adjustment  (1) 
Gross margin under the current NISA program is calculated as  
Gross margin = Eligible Revenue – Eligible Expenses(b)          (2) 
Under CFIP, gross margin is calculated as 
Gross margin = Eligible Revenue – Eligible Expenses(b) + Accrual Adjustment    (3) 
Production margin (1) is structurally higher than the gross margin calculated under (3).  The 
reason for this is that the gross margin calculation includes eligible expense items (b) that are not 
eligible expenses (a) in the production margin calculation.  At the same time, the eligible 
revenues under either gross margin or production margin calculations are identical.  Production 
margin (1) will therefore be greater than the CFIP gross margin (3) by precisely the difference in 
eligible expenses between (1) and (3).  Thus, for a given farm in a given year, production margin 
under (1) above will be structurally higher than gross margin (3). 
The difference between gross margins under the current NISA (2) and CFIP (3) is the accrual 
adjustment.  The implication is that, ignoring accrual adjustments, the production margin under 
the proposed program (1) is structurally higher than the gross margin under the current NISA (2).  
However, because of the impact of the accrual adjustments, in practice production margin (1) 
need not necessarily be larger than the gross margin under current NISA (2).   
Based on these observations on the differences between production margin and gross margins, 
the following questions are relevant: 
•  What provides the rationale for exclusion of specific cost items as eligible expenses under 
production margin relative to gross margin? 
•  What impact does the shift from production margin to gross margin have on the level of 
support? 
•  What is the relative variability between production margin and gross margin? 
•  What is the apparent impact of shifting specific cost items into the margin under (1) from 
eligible expenses under (2) on specific farm types? 
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Specific Cost Items Under Gross Margin and Production Margin 
The specific cost items that are included as eligible expenses under the existing CFIP/NISA 
gross margin concept, but not included as eligible expenses for the production margin under the 
proposed program are the following, listed with the NISA code: 
•  Machinery repairs, licenses, and insurance (9760) 
•  Advertising and marketing costs (9792) 
•  Building and fence repairs (9795) 
•  Agricultural contract work (9798) 
•  Other insurance premiums (9804) 
•  Memberships subscription fees (9807) 
•  Office expenses (9808) 
•  Legal and accounting fees (9809) 
•  Salaries (other than spouse) (9815) 
•  Salaries paid to dependants (9816) 
•  Motor vehicle expenses (9819) 
•  Small tools (9820) 
•  Soil testing (9821) 
•  Licenses and permits (9823) 
•  Telephone (9824) 
•  Salaries paid to spouse or common-law partner (9828) 
•  Other (specify) (9897) 
According to members of the federal-provincial committee of program administrators, the 
following criteria were used to determine whether to include individual cost items as eligible 
expenses: 
•  Exclude expenses directly related to production in the current year. 
•  Exclude expenses that are within a farmer’s control. 
•  Exclude expenses that are discretionary or subject to moral hazard. An Assessment of the Proposed  
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Table B-1 presents the rationale given by the committee of program administrators for exclusion 
of the specific cost items in the above list.  Table B-1 shows that many of the costs excluded 
from eligibility are not within the producer’s control, but are also not directly linked to 
production in the current year.  Other costs are within a producer’s control and could be subject 
to manipulation.  Many of the expense items excluded as eligible costs under the proposed 
program are outside of a farmer’s control, but do not vary with production scale and are not 
likely to be subject to significant variability over time in any case. 
The non-arms length labour issue may be considered a moral hazard but it may also not treat on 
an equitable basis, those producers who rely on multi-family labour and/or ownership. 
 Table B-2 below provides an assessment of the impact of moving cost items from eligible 
expenses under gross margin into the margin under the production margin concept according to 
farm type.  The data are drawn from the database of farms with NISA accounts between 1993-
2001, with accrual adjustments.  Table B-2 shows that as a result of moving eligible expenses 
into the margin under the production margin concept, eligible expenses decreased by $26,000 to 
$246,000.  The share of this decrease varied across cost items according to farm type.  For 
example, horticultural farms had the greatest share of the decrease due to wages and salaries, 
while cash crop and beef farms had machinery expenses as the greatest share of the reduction in 
eligible expenses.    
Table B-1:  Rationale For Exclusion of Specific Cost Items as Eligible Expenses Under 
Proposed Program 
Cost Item  Rationale for Exclusion 
Machinery repairs, licenses, and 
insurance 
Subject to producer’s discretion, not directly related 
to production in the current year  
Advertising and marketing costs   Discretionary; within producer’s control 
Building and fence repairs   Subject to producer’s discretion, not directly related 
to production in the current year  
Agricultural contract work  Subject to producer’s discretion, substitute for 
capital which is not directly related to production in 
the current year  
Other insurance premiums  not directly related to production in the current year 
Memberships subscription fees   not directly related to production in the current year 
Office expenses   not directly related to production in the current year 
Legal and accounting fees   not directly related to production in the current year An Assessment of the Proposed  
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Cost Item  Rationale for Exclusion 
Salaries (other than spouse)   
Salaries paid to dependants  Discretionary 
Motor vehicle expenses   Subject to producer’s discretion, not directly related 
to production in the current year  
Small tools   Subject to producer’s discretion, not directly related 
to production in the current year  
Soil testing   Within producer’s control 
Licenses and permits   Subject to producer’s discretion, not directly related 
to production in the current year  
Telephone   not directly related to production in the current year  
Salaries paid to spouse or common-law 
partner 
Discretionary 
Other (specify)   Discretionary 
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permits other Salaries Utilities Admin
9760 9795 9798 9804 9807 9819 9820 9823 9897 Salaries Utilities Admin
1993-2001 yr averages
Cattle -$26,100.71 25.30% 6.93% 17.07% 2.87% 0.35% 3.42% 2.95% 0.18% 6.52% 19.83% 7.75% 6.80%
Dairy -$62,998.09 16.87% 6.74% 11.39% 2.92% 0.45% 1.92% 2.75% 0.12% 9.38% 31.59% 8.22% 7.66%
Edible Hort -$112,386.50 7.80% 2.78% 8.40% 2.85% 0.25% 1.66% 1.26% 0.15% 9.56% 52.17% 6.61% 6.51%
Grains -$24,553.12 28.66% 4.56% 17.72% 2.85% 0.32% 3.73% 2.54% 0.22% 4.58% 21.90% 6.94% 5.98%
Hogs -$75,843.08 18.06% 7.92% 12.46% 3.01% 0.20% 2.03% 2.16% 0.08% 6.31% 28.75% 12.48% 6.54%
Inedible Hort -$246,185.08 4.51% 3.90% 2.85% 1.03% 0.16% 2.43% 1.06% 0.07% 10.34% 59.08% 8.77% 5.79%
Livestock -$33,643.78 15.42% 7.37% 13.58% 2.82% 0.65% 2.66% 2.59% 0.22% 9.84% 27.44% 7.20% 10.21%
Other -$45,535.93 23.03% 9.16% 9.45% 2.39% 0.30% 2.91% 2.52% 0.20% 6.95% 23.03% 10.88% 9.18%
Potato -$159,051.60 19.22% 2.93% 11.15% 2.00% 0.30% 1.77% 0.84% 0.33% 3.86% 48.75% 4.72% 4.14%
Poultry & Eggs -$98,287.68 10.79% 5.00% 7.94% 2.47% 0.41% 1.97% 1.67% 0.15% 12.44% 40.34% 9.06% 7.74%
Tobacco -$78,698.95 10.77% 3.48% 5.45% 2.85% 0.25% 0.93% 1.61% 0.07% 4.55% 60.94% 5.48% 3.64%An Assessment of the Proposed  
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Level of Support and Negative Margins 
Relative to CFIP gross margins and current NISA gross margins under small accrual 
adjustments, the proposed program will offer a higher base for support.  This higher base 
is precisely the amount of the decreased eligible costs illustrated in Table Y.  As another 
example, for the most recent year on the mid-sized Ontario cash crop farm, the reference 
gross margin under the existing NISA program is $259,905, while the comparable 
reference production margin is $424,893.  Since neither the existing nor the proposed 
program covers negative margins, the potential base for support is significant.  Because 
the proposed program starts from a higher base, the issue of unprotected negative margins 
should be less common relative to the current program. 
Variability in Production Margin Relative to Gross Margin 
Variability in the production margin or gross margin is an important issue, because it 
represents the risk that is assumed by the producer and not covered by the safety net 
program.  As a conceptual issue, the variability of the production margin relative to the 
gross margin hinges on the variability in the expense items that are included in the 
margin under the production margin concept, but are eligible expenses under the gross 
margin concept.  To illustrate, consider the following.  Under the gross margin concept, 
the difference between eligible revenues and eligible costs (i.e. the gross margin- profits 
and ineligible costs) is risky.  One measure of this risk is the statistical variance of the 
gross margin.   
If X represents the gross margin, Y represents eligible revenue, and Z represents eligible 
costs, then the gross margin is given by 
X = Y - Z 
And the risk in the gross margin is given by  
Variance [X] = variance[Y] + variance[Z] – 2*covariance[Y,Z]        
 (4) 
Under the production margin concept, some of the cost items listed above are moved 
from the eligible expenses into the margin.  As described above, ignoring any differences 
due to accrual adjustments, this means that the production margin exceeds the gross 
margin (X) structurally by the value of the cost items in Table X above.  If we let the 
value of the cost items in Table X be b, then  
Production Margin = X + b = Y – [Z-b] 
and the risk in the production margin is given by  
Variance[X + b] = Variance[Y] + {variance[Z] + variance[b] – 2*covariance[Z,b]}– 
2*covariance[Y,Z-b]            
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The sufficient condition for producers to bear more margin risk under the proposed 
program than under current programs is for  
Variance[X + b] > Variance[X] 
To conceptually test this, we subtract the risk expression in (4) from (5): 
Variance[X + b] - Variance[X] = [Variance[Y] +{variance[Z] + variance[b] – 
2*covariance[Z,b]}– 2*covariance[Y,Z-b]] – [variance[Y] + [variance[Z] – 
2*covariance[Y,Z]], or 
Variance[X + b] - Variance[X] = variance[b] – 2*covariance[Z,b] – 2*covariance[Y,Z-b] 
+   2 * c o v a r i a n c e [ Y , Z ]           
 (6) 
If (6) is positive, it means that the producer bears more risk under production margin than 
they did under the gross margin.  Expression (6) suggests two tradeoffs in understanding 
the relative risk under the production margin relative to the gross margin: 
•  Variation in the cost items moved from the eligible category to the ineligible cost 
category (b) relative to the correlation between b and the eligible costs under the 
current program.  The lower the variance in b and the higher the correlation between 
b and the eligible costs, the relatively lower the risk in the production margin. 
•  Correlation between revenue and eligible costs under the production margin concept 
and the correlation between revenue and eligible costs under the gross margin 
concept.  The higher the correlation between revenue and eligible expenses under the 
production margin (and relative to the gross margin), the relatively lower the risk 
under the production margin.    
Insufficient data has been presented to satisfactorily evaluate, based on the conceptual 
information above, whether the risk in the production margin exceeds the gross margin 
(i.e. whether expression 6 above is positive, negative, or zero).  The only recourse is to 
appeal to the anticipated findings if data were available.  Based on the description of the 
cost items included Table B-1 above, it appears that most of the cost items in b are of a 
fixed or overhead cost nature.  Thus, it is anticipated that the first two terms in (6) would 
probably be small.  That being the case, the material issue is the magnitude of the latter 
two terms relating the correlation between revenue and eligible costs under the 
production margin and gross margin concepts.  If the cost items in b are not highly 
variable, as argued above, it is likely that they will act as a buffer (or as “noise”) to the 
expense items that are highly variable.  Indeed, in order for a margin protection program 
to work effectively, the full variability in significant cost items must be observed in 
calculating the margin.  This suggests that the correlation between revenue and the 
eligible expenses is likely to be highest under the production margin concept, and that the 
risk in the margin should be at least no greater (and possibly smaller) under the 
production margin than it is under the gross margin.  